Orthodoxy is sick

The history of the Orthodox Church is full of dark episodes: violent Christianization and the destruction of pagan sanctuaries, forced baptisms; the blessing of repressions and wars, when religious authority was used to punish dissenters; cooperation of part of the clergy with totalitarian regimes, including the secret services of the USSR; religious intolerance and fanaticism, anti-Semitism, pressure on artists and activists; in modern times—sexual and financial abuses, cover-ups of violence, pedophilia, corruption, and the exploitation of novices. Orthodoxy as an institution has repeatedly turned into an instrument of power and control, and this logic is evident today in the practices of the St. Elisabeth Convent in Minsk, which, despite its public image of charity and trade, is described by critics as a closed community with sect-like features. New novices face harsh treatment: isolation from families and the outside world, restricted contacts and freedom of movement, widespread use of unpaid labor in workshops, shops, and agricultural work, creating an atmosphere of psychological pressure, upbringing through guilt and shame, enforced “humility” and absolute obedience. Spiritual fathers use manipulations, any doubt is declared a sin or “the work of the devil,” criticism is suppressed, and individuality is broken in the name of obedience. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the convent refused to stop services despite mortal danger. Almost half of the sisters were infected, several died, and hierarchs and doctors called this a “crime against one’s neighbor.” In 2020, the convent’s spiritual leader, Archpriest Andrey Lemeshonok, publicly supported President L, which led to mass resignations and dismissals of staff, including the well-known actor Alexander Zhdanovich (“Malyavanych”). In 2019, the convent collected signatures for a criminal ban on so-called “homosexual propaganda,” from which even the leadership of the Belarusian Orthodox Church distanced itself. Since the late 2010s, the rhetoric of the “Russian World” became the norm: Lemeshonok stated that Crimea “was, is, and will be part of Russia.” In 2017, a GRU lieutenant colonel spoke in the convent with military propaganda, exhibitions about “the holy tsar Nicholas II” were held, and after 2022 the convent, according to numerous reports, openly supported the war against Ukraine, collecting money, purchasing vehicles, drones, and equipment for the Russian army. Particularly cynical was the fact that during the war the nuns were allowed to travel abroad and, under the guise of religious activity, sold convent goods at fairs in Warsaw, Copenhagen, and other European cities. The proceeds supported the convent, which in turn funded military efforts. Once this connection became clear, participation in such fairs was restricted and banned. In 2024–2025, journalistic investigations exposed tax evasion schemes and the masking of income as “donations,” while employees reported financial abuses and violations of labor rights, which led to the suspension of certain practices (including the acceptance of “commemorative notes”) in convent trading outlets. The convent’s reputation was further tarnished by episodes of open aggression: at the 2023 “Slavianski Bazaar” festival in Vitebsk, novices rudely pushed musicians, and one slapped a drummer; in 2025, in Rome, convent nuns were expelled from church property after their pro-Russian activity came to light. The convent’s line is reinforced by Metropolitan Veniamin, head of the Belarusian Orthodox Church, who openly supports the ruling authorities, speaks out against abortion and LGBT rights, promotes the conservative model of the “traditional family,” effectively justifying patriarchal control over women and coinciding with the disciplinary atmosphere inside the convent. The cult of St. Elisabeth Feodorovna Romanova, in whose name the convent was founded, is actively used to legitimize the entire structure. In reality, the convent has turned into a hybrid project: a facade of charity and religiosity, while inside there are sect-like methods of control, unpaid labor, and psychological pressure; outwardly it engages in political agitation, military support, trade operations under the guise of piety, and financial schemes. More than that, it functions as a cell of propaganda for the so-called “Russian World,” spreading the ideology of authoritarianism, militarism, and patriarchal domination beyond Belarus and into the international arena, making the convent both a “business holding in cassocks” and a tool of Russian influence and propaganda.